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Abstract
Malware threats are a serious problem for computer secu-
rity, and the ability to detect and classify malware is critical
for maintaining the security level of a computer. Recently,
a number of researchers are investigating techniques for
classifying malware families using malware visualization,
which convert the binary structure of malware into grayscale
images. Although there have been many reports that applied
CNN to malware visualization image classification, it has
not been revealed how to pick out a model that fits a given
malware dataset and achieves higher classification accuracy.
We propose a strategy to select a Deep learning model that
fits the malware visualization images. Our strategy uses the
fine-tuning method for the pre-trained CNN model and a
dataset that solves the imbalance problem. We chose the
VGG19 model based on the proposed strategy to classify
the Malimg dataset. Experimental results show that the
classification accuracy is 99.72 %, which is higher than other
previously proposed malware classification methods.
1 Introduction
Malware threats are a serious problem for computer security,
and the ability to detect and classify malware is critical for
maintaining the security level of a computer. Malware anal-
ysis has a static analysis approach and a dynamic analysis
approach. Static analysis approaches disassemble malware
code, reveal its execution logic and find patterns that trigger
attack behavior. The dynamic analysis approach, on the other
hand, runs malware in a virtual environment and obtains a
report that traces the movement to identify the characteristics
of the attack behavior. The static analysis approach provides
a complete picture of the program structure by reading the
malware code from start to finish. However, in general,
Malware authors obfuscate program code by packing, which
hinders this approach [26]. Although the dynamic analysis
approach does not matter if the program code is obfuscated,
typically only a single execution path is examined [29] and
this can lead to an incomplete comprehension of malware
activity.
In addition to the approach described above, many re-
searchers are investigating technique for classifying malware
families using malware visualization images [26]. This tech-
nique converts the structure of the malware binary sample
into a two-dimensional grayscale image and uses the image
features for classification. As a result, even if the malware
code is obfuscated, it can generate images without being ob-
structed [26]. Moreover, there’s no need to execute malware
programs.
In the field of image recognition, the ConvolutionalNeural
Network (CNN) [14], which is recognized as one of the rep-
resentative methods of Deep Learning [17], is widely applied.
For example, CNN has been applied to the classification of
fruit images [32], medical images [36], criminal investigation
images [19], tread pattern images [20], and face images [15].
Besides, there have been many reports that applied CNN
model to malware visualization image classification [26] [4]
[27] [25] [13] [23]. Unfortunately,it has not been revealed the
way how to pick out a CNN model that fits a given malware
dataset and achieves higher classification accuracy.
We propose a strategy to select a Deep learning model
that fits the malware visualization images. Our strategy
uses the fine-tuning method for the pre-trained CNN model
and a dataset that solves the imbalance problem. We have
selected the VGG19 model based on the proposed strategy to
classify the Malimg dataset. Experimental results show that
the classification accuracy is 99.72%, which is higher than
other previously proposed malware classification methods.
Our contribution of the research can be organized as
follows:
• We proposed a strategy to select a CNN model that
fits the malware visualization images using fine-tuning
method.
• We solved the problem of sample data imbalance be-
tween malware families using the undersampling tech-
nique.
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• We selected the VGG16 fine-tuningmodel and achieved
high accuracy of classifying malware family.
This paper is organized as following: Section 2 presents re-
lated work on malware detection and classification; Section
3 introduces design for stategy comparing the performance
between CNN models using fine-tuning; Section 4 shows ex-
perimental settings; Section 5 provides experimental results;
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
we present the related research regarding malware detec-
tion and classification including static analysis approach,
dynamic analysis approach, malware visualization image in
this section.
2.1 Static Analysis Approach
In relation to static analysis approach, several methods have
been proposed for analyzing the code of malware. For ex-
ample, Lo et al. [22] developed a static analysis tool called
Malicious Code Filter (MCF). The tool used some program
property features to determine if the program is malicious or
not. Masud et al. [24] combined three types of features, bi-
nary n-grams, assembly instruction sequences, and dynamic
link libraries (DLLs) to detect malicious executables. Then,
a classifier for malware detection was builed based on SVM
and Boosted J48. Yakura et al. [38] used CNN attention maps
to extract byte sequences that characterize malware families
from malware binary data. Jung et al. [12] disassembled
the malware binary file and extracted the bytecode. Next,
the bytecode was converted to an image, and malware was
classified based on the convolutional neural network. Sewak
et al. [31] investigated a deep learning-based system for
malware detection. They prepared one and three layers of
Auto-Encoders and two, four and seven layers of Deep Neu-
ral Networks, and evaluated the results of each combination.
Dam and Touili [5] proposed a tool called STAMAD. The
tool automatically classified malware and benign programs
using either extracting API graphs that represent malicious
behavior, or machine learning based on SVM.
2.2 Dynamic Analysis Approach
Regarding the dynamic analysis approach, a number of meth-
ods have been proposed to execute malware and analyze its
behavior. For example, Rhode et al. [28] proposed a model
for detecting malicious files based on a few seconds of the
initial action sequence executed by the malware. The set of
API calls obtained by executing the malware PE file in the
Cuckoo Sandbox was sent to the recurrent neural network
for analysis. Xiaofeng et al. [37] proposed an architecture
for detecting malware by combining machine learning (ran-
dom forest) and deep learning (LSTM) using an API call
sequence. S.L and CD [34] proposed a CNN-based windows
malware detector that detects and classifies malware using
the behavior of Portable Executable (PE) files. The proposed
method executed malware PE files in Sandbox, and obtains
N-grams of API calls. Liu and Wang [21] implemented a
malware detection system based on deep learning and API
calls. They used the Cuckoo Sandbox to extract the API
calling sequence of a malicious program and evaluated it
with BLSTM. Li et al. [18] proposed a technique for detect-
ing kernel-resident malware using the location of the page
global directory and the instruction set of the processor. They
implemented the technique in a tool called Fluorescence and
showed that 200 virtual machines could be inspected in about
an hour.
2.3 Generating hostile attacks against mal-
ware detection
In recent years, research results have been reported that
generate not only malware detection methods but also attack
methods that invalidate malware detection. Grosse et al. [8]
has extended existing hostile sample creation algorithms to
build effective attacks against malware detection models.
This approach works in the discrete binary input domain.
Rosenberg et al. [30] generated a hostile example of an RNN
malware classifier based on API calls. They have shown that
the proposed attack is feasible by implementing a black box
attack.
2.4 Malware Visualization Approach
As for the method of malware classification using malware
visualization image, many researchers have reported results
using the Malimg dataset. Nataraj et al. [26] selected GIST
to extract image features and classified them using k-nearest
neighbors. As a result, they obtained a classification accu-
racy of 97.18% . Nonetheless, the confusion matrix showed
that there was some confusion between "C2Lop.P" and
"C2Lop.gen! G". Then there was a similar confusion be-
tween "Swizzor.gen! I" and "Swizzor.gen! E". As the name
implied, each malware family had similar characteristics.
Therefore, a new approach was needed to classify these
families. Kosmidis and Kalloniatis [16] classified malware
images using machine learning techniques such as Decision
Tree,Nearest Centroid, StochasticGradient, Perceptron,Mul-
tilayer Perceptron, and Random Forest. Of these techniques,
the best result was Random Forest with 91.6% accuracy. Cui
et al. [4] used CNN to extract image features and classify
malware families. In the paper, the number of data belonging
to each family is equalized before learning based on data aug-
mentation. As a result of the experiment, the classification
accuracy reached 94.5%. Furthermore, Precision and Recall
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were almost the same. This indicates that not only malware
families with large data samples were classified correctly, but
also that malware families with small data ware classified
with a certain degree of accuracy.
In addition, various methods using deep learning models
have been reported. Rezende et al. [27] prepared a ResNet50
model in which all convolutional layer parameters were
transferred from a model previously trained on an ImageNet
dataset. Experimental results indicate that malware families
could be classified with an accuracy of 98.62%. Mourtaji
et al. [25] report that the VGG16 model was used for clas-
sification with an accuracy of 97.02%. Kalash et al. [13]
state that malware families were classified with an accuracy
of 98.52% using M-CNN based on VGG16. Lo et al. [23]
indicate that the Xception model achieved a classification
accuracy of 99.03%. These four reports, nevertheless, do not
sufficiently reveal how to pick out a model that fits a given
malware dataset. Moreover, since these reports show neither
confusion matrices nor evaluation metrics such as Precision
and Recall, it is not clear how accurately these proposed
models classified malware families containing only small
data samples.
3 Strategy Design
This section reveals our strategy design.
Our strategy uses the fine-tuning method for the pre-
trained CNN model and a dataset that solves the imbalance
problem.
3.1 CNN fine-tuning model
We classify malware visualization images using a convo-
lutional neural network pre-trained using ImageNet. Ima-
geNet [6] is a database that stores over 14 million color
images and is intended for use by researchers. As shown in
figure 1 [1], the classification accuracy of each CNN model
has been clarified. As an example of a strategy for classifying
malware visualized images, you can select a model with as
high a classification accuracy as possible. However, note
that this metric does not indicate general performance for all
datasets. We believe that the compatibility of the model with
the dataset is an important factor when choosing a model.
Therefore, we decided to check the compatibility between
the dataset and the deep learning model by evaluating the
performance of learning the dataset that solved the imbalance
problem.
Fine-tuning is widely used technique for model reuse,
and it has several unfrozen layers in the pre-trained model
[7]. Our strategy uses fine-tuning with unified conditions
to compare the performance between CNN models. The
condition is to freeze 80 % of the convolutional layers and
train the remaining 20 % on image features. The main
reason for setting this condition is that Tajbakhsh et al. [35]
Table 1: Deep Neural Network benchmarks.
Model Year FLOPs Params Accuracy Accuracy
(M) (M) (top-1) (top-5)
AlexNet 2012 955.21 61.10 56.52 79.07
VGG11 2014 8171.57 132.86 69.02 88.63
VGG13 2014 11895.04 133.05 69.93 89.25
VGG16 2014 16063.36 138.36 71.59 90.38
VGG19 2014 20231.68 143.67 72.38 90.88
ResNet18 2015 1836.82 11.69 69.76 89.08
ResNet34 2015 3692.78 21.80 73.31 91.42
ResNet50 2015 4154.96 25.56 76.13 92.86
ResNet101 2015 7892.77 44.55 77.37 93.55
ResNet152 2015 11636.60 60.19 78.31 94.05
Inception-v3 2015 5730.17 27.16 75.64 92.59
Inception-v4 2015 12561.10 42.68 80.08 94.89
SqueezeNet-v1 2016 865.78 1.25 58.09 80.42
SqueezeNet-v1.1 2016 377.80 1.24 58.18 80.62
DenseNet 121 2017 2928.89 7.98 74.43 91.97
DenseNet 169 2017 3473.88 14.15 75.60 92.81
DenseNet 201 2017 4435.03 20.01 76.87 93.37
DenseNet 161 2017 7902.37 28.68 77.14 93.56
Xception 2017 8494.59 22.86 78.89 94.29
MobileNetV2 2017 336.43 3.50 71.81 90.42
ShuffleNet-v2.05 2018 52.32 1.37 60.55 81.75
ShuffleNet-v2.1 2018 160.09 2.28 k69.36 88.32
MnasNet 2018 649.51 4.38 61.95 84.73
PNASNet 2018 25945.87 86.06 82.74 95.99
NasNet 2018 24882.21 88.75 82.51 96.02
NasNet mobile 2018 667.75 5.29 74.08 91.74
evaluated the adaptation between fine-tuning and the dataset,
and they found that neither shallow tuning nor deep tuning
was the optimal select for a particular image dataset.
Subsequently, we discard the original fully-connected
layer prepared for classifying 1000 classes from each fine-
tuning models. Then we designed new fully-conneced layers
to classify the 25 classes and added them to each model. We
also train the parameters of this new fully-connected layer by
image features. Our proposedmodel architecture is shown in
Figure 1. The fully-conneced layers shown in Figure 1 are
used in all our experiments.
3.2 Approach to imbalanced dataset
In general, models generated by directly learning imbal-
anced data have poor classification accuracy for classes
with a small number of samples. Therefore, there are many
research reports on the problem of data imbalance. The
class imbalance approaches can be divided into two main
categories,1)data-level,and 2)algorithm-level approaches [9].
The data-level approaches improve the distribution of data
such as oversampling the minority classes or undersampling
the majority classes. On the other hand, the algorithm level
approaches adjust the classifier itself based on cost-oriented
learning.
We use the Malimg dataset [2] created by Nataraj et al.
[26] to classify malware visualization images. Malimg is
a dataset of 9339 images, including 25 malware families.
According to a report from the author, the malware based
on this dataset is wild malware submitted to the Anubis
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Figure 1: Example of our fine-tuning model and fully-
connected layer.
analysis system. Each malware is labeled by Microsoft Secu-
rity Essentials and classified into different malware families.
In this paper, the number of malware image samples is
imbalanced, as shown in Figure 2 [4]. As for the number
of images belonging to each family, Allaple.A has 2949
images, while Skintrim.N,WinTrim.BX and Autorun.K have
only 80, 97 and 106 images respectively. Among the several
approaches to imbalanced data, we adopt the undersampling
method. The main reason is that most families in the Malimg
dataset have roughly similar sample sizes, except for the
three families Allaple.A, Allaple.L, and Yuner.A.
Figure 2: Number of malware images in different families.
4 Experimental Settings
This section describes our experimental settings. The con-
tents are composed of Dataset, Evaluation metrics, and Eval-
uation environment.
4.1 Dataset
We undersample the Malimg dataset and set the maximum
number of samples belonging to each malware family to 80
so that all classes have the same number of samples. Yet,
as a result of undersampling, important features may be lost.
so, we also prepare groups that set the maximum number of
samples to 160, 240, and 320. Expample of the number of
image samples belonging to each class is as shown in the
table 2. We kept 90% of the dataset as training data and the
rest as test data in all experiments. Note that we did not use
data augmentation in the training process in all experiments.
4.2 Evaluation metrics
We use the accuracy, precision, and recall for evaluation
metrics. These evaluation metrics are adopted frequently in
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Table 2: The number of samples for our experiment.
No. Family Original Max320 Max240 Max160 Max80
1 Allaple.L 1591 320 240 160 80
2 Allaple.A 2949 320 240 160 80
3 Yuner.A 800 320 240 160 80
4 Lolyda.AA1 213 213 213 160 80
5 Lolyda.AA2 184 184 184 160 80
6 Lolyda.AA3 123 123 123 123 80
7 C2Lop.P 146 146 146 146 80
8 C2Lop.gen!g 200 200 200 160 80
9 Instantaccess 431 320 240 160 80
10 Swizzor.gen!l 132 132 132 132 80
11 Swizzor.gen!E 128 128 128 128 80
12 VB.AT 408 320 240 160 80
13 Fakerean 381 320 240 160 80
14 Alueron.gen!J 198 198 198 160 80
15 Malex.gen!J 136 136 136 136 80
16 Lolyda.AT 159 159 159 159 80
17 Adialer.C 122 122 122 122 80
18 WinTrim.BX 97 97 97 97 80
19 Dialplatform.B 177 177 177 160 80
20 Dontovo.A 162 162 162 160 80
21 Obfuscator.AD 142 142 142 142 80
22 Agent.FYI 116 116 116 116 80
23 Autorun.K 106 106 106 106 80
24 Rbot!gen 158 158 158 158 80
25 Skintrim.N 80 80 80 80 80
Total 9339 4699 4219 3565 2000
the research community to provide comprehensive assess-
ments of imbalanced learning problems [4]. These metrics
are defined as follows:
precision = TP/(TP+FP)
recall = TP/(TP+FN)
accuracy = (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)
where true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) are the
number of samples correctly and wrongly classified as mal-
ware. Likewise, true negative (TN) and false negative (FN)
are the number of samples correctly and wrongly classified
as benign.
4.3 Evaluation environment
This experiment uses the environment shown in Table 3 and
the hyperparameter shown in Table 4.
5 Experimental Result
In this section, we shows our experimental results. We first
evaluated the models using a dataset that solved the data
imbalance problem and Fine-tuning models pretrained on
ImageNet. Next, we investigated the optimal Fine-tuning and
undersampling for the model we selected, and showed the
Table 3: Experimental environment
CPU Intel Core i9-9900K
Memory 32GB
GPU Nvidia GeForce RTX 2080Ti
OS Ubuntu 18.04 LTS 64bit
Code Keras on top of TensorFlow
Table 4: The hyper parameters for CNN models
Loss Function Categorical Cross Entropy
Optimizer SGD
Learning Rate 1e-4
Momentum 0.9
Batch Size 32
results that classified the entire Malimg dataset. Finally, we
compared our experimental results with previous reports.
5.1 Selecting models that fits the dataset
We have prepared models pre-trained on ImageNet: Nas-
Net [39], DenseNet201 [11], Xception [3], ResNet50 [10],
VGG19 [33], VGG16 [33]. We fine-tuned each model and
frozen 80% of the convolutional layers. The training and
validation results are as shown in the figure 3 and figure 4.
Figure 3 shows that ACC and LOSS showed almost iden-
tical curves for all models. On the other hand, as shown fig-
ure 4, Val_acc value increased and Val_loss value decreased
only in the VGG16 and VGG19 models. Of course, depend-
ing on the design of some parameters, it is possible that other
models could improve the verification capabilities. However,
in our strategy, these models have not been able to obtain
sufficient validation capabilities using the Max80 dataset.
Table shows the classification accuracy when the verification
was performed. We selected VGG16 model because it was
slightly more accurate than VGG19 model.
Table 5 shows the classification accuracy using 9339 im-
ages of the whole Malimg dataset. Because the classification
accuracy between VGG16 and VGG19 was very small, we
chose both models at this stage.
5.2 Investigating optimal undersampling and
fine-tuning
We investigated the optimal fine-tuning of selected VGG16
and VGG19 models. We preparedMax80, Max160,Max240
and Max320 dataset for the investigation. First, We trained
and validated Max80, Max160, Max240, Max320 using
VGG19 frozen 80%. The validation performance results
were shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Comparing Figure 5
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Figure 3: Training performance of each models.
Figure 4: Validation performance of each models.
and Figure 6, the former with a larger number of samples
had higher Accuracy and a lower Loss. This result shows
that reducing the sample data extremely by undersampling
reduces the classification accuracy. Referring to Figure 6 (a),
since Max240 and Max320 drew almost the same curve, we
conjecture that these numbers would be the optimal value for
undersampling. In both Figure 5 (b) and Figure 6 (b), the loss
is dropping steadily, which means that there is no tendency
for over-fitting.
Next,We trained and validatedMax240 andMax320 using
frozen 80%, frozen 60%, frozen 40% and frozen 20%, and
the top of the results are as shown in Table 6. Figure 7
and Figure 8 show the confusion matrices generated by the
VGG19 and VGG16 models. All classes are observed to be
able to classify malware without major errors.
5.3 Comparison with other reports
We compared the classification accuracy of our chosen
model with that of other reports for malware visualization
image classification. Table 7 shows that the classification
accuracy of our selected model is higher than any previously
reported method using Malimg dataset and that we can
effectively classify the Malimg dataset.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a strategy to select a Deep learning model that
fits the malware visualization images. First,we solved the
problem of sample data imbalance betweenmalware families
using the undersampling technique. Second, we selected
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Table 5: Classification results of 9339 images by the model frozen 80% trained by Max80
Model Accuracy Precision(micro) Precision(macro) Recall(micro) Recall(macro)
VGG19 98.83 98.83 97.53 98.83 97.63
VGG16 98.82 98.82 97.55 98.82 97.46
Figure 5: Validation performance of Max80 and Max160. Figure 6: Validation performance of Max240 and Max320.
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Table 6: Classification results of 9339 malware images by VGG16 and VGG19
Model Accuracy Precision Precision Recall Recall
(micro) (macro) (micro) (macro)
VGG19 Frozen60% trained by Max320 99.72 99.72 99.47 99.72 99.76
VGG16 Frozen40% trained by Max320 99.72 99.72 99.44 99.72 99.74
VGG16 Frozen40% trained by Max240 99.68 99.68 99.31 99.66 99.56
VGG19 Frozen60% trained by Max240 99.65 99.65 99.21 99.65 99.58
Figure 7: Confusion matrix: VGG19 Frozen60% model trained by Max320 with 99.72% accuracy (Best).
8
Figure 8: Confusion matrix: VGG16 Frozen40%model trained by Max320 with 99.72% accuracy.
Table 7: Comparison of accuracy for Malimg dataset
Methods Accuracy
CNN [4] 94.50%
GIST + K-nearest neighbors [26] 97.18%
M-CNN (VGG16) [13] 98.52%
ResNet50 [27] 98.62%
Xception [23] 99.03%
VGG19 (ours) 99.72%
a CNN model that fits the malware visualization images
using fine-tuning method. Finally, we selected the VGG16
fine-tuning model and achieved high accuracy of classifying
malware family. In the future, there is an approach to im-
prove the proposed strategy by preparing a dataset with a
larger malware sample.
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